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Abstract 
 
Models of creative problem solving are predicated upon mental states to explain 
everything from the outcome of problem-solving experiments to the emergence of artistic 
creativity. We present two converging perspectives that describe a profoundly different 
ontological description of creativity. Our analysis proceeds from a distinction between first-
order problem solving, where the agent interacts with a physical model of the problem and 
second-order problem solving, where the agent must cogitate a solution to a problem that is 
presented as a verbal description of a state of the world but where the agent does not or 
cannot transform physical elements of a problem. We acknowledge the recent evidence that 
foregrounds the importance of working memory in problem solving, including insight 
problem solving. However, we stress that the impressive psychometric success is obtained 
with a methodology that only measures second-order problem solving; we question whether 
first-order problem solving is equally well predicted by measures of cognitive or 
dispositional capacities. We propose that if mental simulation is replaced by the opportunity 
to engage with a physical model of a problem then the environment can provide affordances 
that help the participant to solve problems. In the second part of the paper, we present the 
subjective experience of an artist as he monitors the micro-decisions that occur during the 
morphogenesis of a large, clay, sculptural installation. The testimony is a vivid demonstration 
that creative action occurs, not in the brain, but in the movement between the hand and the 
clay. Insight becomes outsight.  
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Insight Out: Making Creativity Visible 
 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance and influence of Wolgang Köhler’s 
(1925) “The mentality of apes” on the psychology of problem solving, insight and creativity. 
As a nascent scientific discipline, psychology was embracing behaviourism with its 
associated methodological and ontological proclivities, yet Köhler’s ethological observations 
and inferences were couched in mentalist terms. Problem solving in these chimpanzees was 
not described in terms of the concatenation of stimulus-response sequences through gradual 
associative learning. Rather, some of the solutions to the problems engineered by Köhler for 
these animals appear to reflect insight, a sudden discovery of a path to solution. In one 
instance, Sultan - one of Kohler’s star performers, was shown a banana attached to the roof of 
an enclosure, 2 meters from the ground. A box is placed in the middle of the room; the 
banana is 2.5 meters from the box. Köhler writes (p. 41): “Sultan suddenly stood still in front 
of the box, seized it, tipped it hastily straight towards the objective, climbed upon the box and 
springing upwards with all his force, tore down the banana.” In what would be called the 
Gestalt account of insight, a solution reflects the sudden reconfiguration of perceptual 
elements. The mental representation of the problem is initially misaligned with the 
representation of the goal. The tension between these mental representations trigger 
unconscious processes that seek to harmonize these two representations, to create a good 
gestalt (Gilhooly & Webb, 2018).  
The current science of insight problem solving in particular shares a lot in common 
with this initial theoretical account. Animal ethology no longer prefigures so centrally of 
course, and an experimental methodology is largely favoured over single case studies, but the 
aim is to identify the cognitive processes that turn an initially incorrect or unproductive 
problem representation into one within which the solution offers itself in the agent’s mental 
look ahead horizon. To forego the cost and patience involved in observing people’s problem 
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solving outside the lab, cognitive psychologists create miniature problem solving 
environments designed to encourage an incorrect representation of an ostensibly simple 
problem or riddle. In the psychologist’s laboratory, insight problem solving research usually 
proceeds by presenting participants a riddle, such as “the thing that can move heavy logs, but 
cannot move a small nail” (Luo & Nikki, 2003, p. 317), or how do you throw a ping pong 
ball in such a way that it travels a certain distance, comes to a dead stop and then reverses 
direction (to adapt, Ansburg & Dominowski, 1980) or “if you have black socks and brown 
socks in your drawer mixed in the ration of 4:5, how many socks do you need to take out to 
be sure of having a pair of the same color” (Fleck & Weisberg, 2013, p. 446; this problem is 
also used in Chuderski & Jastrzębski, 2018, reviewed below). These riddles are created to 
mislead, to encourage an incorrect interpretation that will frustrate the direct application of 
long term memory knowledge to identify a solution. To create a conceptual impasse is the 
point, of course, and then researchers observe how the impasse is overcome. A few 
participants will eventually say, ‘river’, ‘vertically’, and ‘3 socks’, but most will labour 
fruitlessly until the end of the allocated time (usually a few minutes). Using a broad range of 
measures, psychologists are interested in the phenomenology of insight, neuroimages of areas 
that are more active when an insightful solution is achieved, or the conscious analytic 
strategy revealed through protocol analysis.  
The current debate in the psychology of insight problem solving (e.g., Gilhooly & 
Webb, 2018) pitches the so-called business-as-usual view against the special-processes view. 
The latter has roots in early Gestalt ideas: insight is the result of a swift change in the manner 
with which a problem is represented in the mind. The sudden awareness of the solution 
suggests that insight is not the product of a conscious deliberate analysis of the problem, 
proceeding incrementally, helping the agent formulate a workable solution gradually over 
time. The ‘special’ in special processes underscores that insight is the product of non-routine 
cognition that largely operates non-consciously (Ohlsson, 2018). If routine cognition, in turn, 
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is in the business of helping an agent to plan and solve problems, then the business-as-usual 
view holds that insight is the product of conscious, deliberate, and incremental effort to solve 
a problem. From this perspective, a breakthrough may well yield a eureka moment, but that 
distinct phenomenological signature does not imply that something other than routine 
cognition is involved in insight.  
Working Memory: The Psychometric Approach 
If insight is the result of unconscious thinking, then working memory, as the conscious 
mental space over which people mentally manipulate, rehearse, and store relevant 
information when thinking, might not be implicated in insight problem solving. In turn, the 
business-as-usual view holds that a participant’s working memory capacity and executive 
function skills should predict that participant’s ability to solve insight problems. Researchers 
employ a psychometric approach to test these ideas (Chuderski & Jastrzębski, 2018): 
participants sit through a session composed of insight problems and various working memory 
capacity tests. Performance on these insight problems—usually measured simply in terms of 
the number of correct answers—is correlated with performance on working memory tests. 
For example, Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) reported that measures of verbal and visuo-spatial 
working memory explained a significant portion of variance in insight problem solving. This 
suggests that people’s ability to solve the riddles that are offered as insight problems, 
correlate with working memory capacity, which in turn correlates with measures of 
intelligence. The state of the art of this approach is well illustrated in Chuderski and 
Jastrzębski (2018): A large and heterogeneous sample of participants were tested over an 8-
hour session on a large number of different insight problems (verbal, spatial, mathematical 
and matchstick arithmetic problems as well as compound remote associates presented as a 
pen and paper exercise) and a wide set of working memory and executive function tasks; 
participants also completed as a battery of personality, anxiety and motivation measures. 
Scores on all these measures are, in the first instance, correlated, yielding a sizable 
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correlation matrix (Table 5, p. 270); measures of working memory and executive function all 
correlated positively with composite performance scores for all types of insight problems. 
Factor analysis is then used to identify and confirm the presence of a separate reasoning 
ability and insight ability latent variable, themselves strongly correlated and significantly 
linked to all measures of working memory capacity and executive function skills (Figure 3, p. 
272). Chuderski and Jastrzębski (2018, p. 276): conclude: “Above half of the variance in 
insight problem solving explained here by working memory capacity constitutes a strong 
refutation of the claims (...) that working memory is unrelated, or even negatively related, to 
insight problem solving”. The psychometric approach thus foregrounds the importance of 
working memory capacity in insight1 problem solving. Such a model explains creative 
problem solving in terms of an agent’s cognitive capacities: The better these capacities the 
better positioned an agent is at solving problems.  
Let’s consider how the research on insight problem solving proceeds in the laboratory 
and how the research methodology employed by the psychometric approach validates and 
reinforces a model of problem solving that casts working memory as playing a central role. 
The dominant research paradigm is erected on the twin pillars of mentalism and 
methodological individualism. The research proceeds on the assumption that the world is 
mentally represented and located inside the person, or more specifically, the person’s head. 
As a result of this ontological position, the research methodology must focus on the 
individual and his or her internal cognitive capacities. The individual’s mental 
representations are transformed on the basis of rules and operators. It is not surprising that 
individual differences in working memory capacity and intelligence explain a substantial 
portion of the variance in problem solving performance: Working memory capacity underlie 
                                               
1 Classifying problems as ‘insight’ problems does not mean or guarantee a priori that a solution for these 
problems will exhibit the key phenomenological elements of an insightful one (viz. suddenness, positive 
emotionality, conviction of the correct solution; Bowden & Grunewald, 2018). 
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a person’s ability to construct, maintain and transform representations of the world. Crucially, 
the methodology employed tasks participants to think about short vignettes—a few words or 
sentences— that describe ambiguously some state of the world; in other words, participants 
are not embedded in a physical world to solve a problem that arises in that world, (first order 
problem solving), but rather problem solving is removed from the external world, conducted 
on the basis of representations of the world (second-order problem solving). Second order 
problem solving proceeds from participants’ interpretation and representations of these 
representations. In other words, the problems that could arise in a physical world, 
corresponding to physical processes of varying complexity, are presented as second-order 
abstractions. First-order problem solving is impossible since participants cannot engage or 
interact with a physical presentation of the problem. Second order problem solving carries 
with it a representational toll and as a result, individual differences in the ability to maintain 
and transform mental representations—as gauged in terms of working memory capacity—
correlate with problem solving performance. The research methodology thus validates rather 
than tests the foundational pillars of the psychometric research programme.  
First-order Problem Solving: Insight Distilled through Action. Let’s transpose the 
socks problem, as described above, from verbal riddle into a physical model of the problem 
(from second order to first order). Imagine a duffle bag with 40 black socks and 50 brown 
socks. Our participant reads the problem description and is invited to determine how many 
socks she’ll have to sample before getting a pair of matching colour. She’s told she can dig 
into the bag and pull a few socks, one at a time, to help her solve the problem. The 
misleading ratio information in the problem description might not attract her attention as 
much as it would otherwise were she only presented with the riddle without a physical model 
of the problem. She might not know how to solve the problem; she starts pulling a few 
individual socks, not strategically, not with a plan in mind, no proto-solution guiding her 
action, but simply exploring, interacting with the problem and observing results. The 
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misleading ratio information quickly fails to exert any attraction; rather she’s looking at the 
results of her sampling from the bag. She may pull two black socks from the start, tempted to 
say that the answer might simply be ‘two’, but realises that she’s been lucky, pulls a third one 
and fourth one, and the solution dawns on her; the solution is distilled through action and 
results. The insight, if there is one to experience, takes place when she observes the results of 
her actions.  
We offer this intuition pump as a means to illustrate the plausibility of how the solution 
to the problem might unfold on the basis of actions. Pulling socks out of the bag is an 
epistemic action (e.g., Kirsh, 2009), each drawn sock providing information and the outcome 
of a few draws brings the solution into focus. That is, the solution of the problem is observed 
rather than mentally simulated. No exact plan or arithmetic knowledge determines her 
behaviour. Interacting with a physical model of the problem offers perceptual information 
and action possibilities. Problem solving is taken out of the head and enacted in the world: 
The solution is physically crafted and perceived. First-order problem solving is generally 
embodied and necessarily situated, that is reflecting the assembly of a “transient extended 
cognitive system” (Wilson & Clark, 2009) that recruits and exploits artifacts in the reasoner’s 
immediate environment. However, the more important aspect of first-order problem solving 
may be interactivity, that is how a new idea, the discovery of a solution in this instance, is 
distilled through actions and observations of their resulting impact on the environment. First-
order problem solving unfolds contingently along a spatio-temporal trajectory, shaped by 
actions and dotted with preliminary observations that cue additional actions, and this 
recursive process may result in the discovery of a solution (Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2014). It is incremental, and in that respect shares similarities with the 
gradualism espoused by Weisberg (2018; we return to this point below). 
The reasoner, the physical reality of the problem, and the action possibilities offered by 
the external environment, configure a cognitive ecosystem (Hutchins, 2010). From a 
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cognitive ecology perspective, to adapt Hutchins (2010, p. 712) “perception, action, and 
thought are inextricably integrated: cognitive activity is profoundly situated, social, 
embodied, and richly multimodal”. Interactivity assembles, creates and maintains this 
ecosystem. Furthermore, it might be more useful to profile the cognitive resources of the 
system as a whole, rather than those of the agent segregated from the system. For example, 
consider a simple mental arithmetic task, consisting of adding a series of single-digit number. 
If the numbers appear on tokens that the agent can touch and move, then the transient 
extended cognitive system in this instance will scaffold the working memory resources of the 
agent, may improve executive skills, attenuate the negative impact of maths anxiety on 
performance, and permit the expression of more complex arithmetic strategies (Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2013; Vallée-Tourangeau, Sirota, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2016).  
In first-order problem solving, interim results, that is proto-solutions that correspond to 
intermediary changes in the physical problem presentation, emerge over time and space. The 
processes at play operate on different time scales: At very short time scales, perception-action 
loops chart the problem-solving trajectory, at slower time scales the reasoner reflects on 
results, taking stock of the past and formulating hypotheses as to what should be done next. 
The problem-solving trajectory is paved through dynamic changes within the physical 
configuration of the problem, which in turn creates a shifting topography of action 
affordances. These actions need not be—and at very short time scales, cannot be—mediated 
by complex representations of the problem. The physical world is there to experience and 
actions may reflect the perceptual exploration of the problem. Traditional concerns with 
working memory capacity make sense only if problem solving is assumed to involve a hefty 
representational burden, that is if it is primarily a second-order problem solving activity. In 
contrast, if problem solving proceeds primarily on the basis of actions that modify the 
physical substrate of the cognitive ecosystem, then changes can in turn focus attention and 
cue action. The solution emerges through changes in the problem configuration enacted and 
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observed by the reasoner. As a process that extends over time and space, problem solving 
follows a contingent itinerary which becomes important to record if we want to understand 
how a problem is actually solved.  
How first-order problem solving can address the current debate in insight problem 
solving researcher, pitting special processes and business-as-usual accounts, remains to be 
systematically explored. The process of undergoing and transformation in first order problem 
solving shares some similarities with the gradualist position developed by Weisberg across 
papers that span nearly half a century (e.g., Weisberg & Suls, 1973; Weisberg, 2018). Here 
innovative thinking, problem solving and creativity are cast in terms of analytic processes 
driven by local analogies with past ideas and practice: There might be important 
discontinuities reflected in a finished work of art (say) with what was done before, but these 
discontinuities were the result of a temporarily-extended process of small changes. Weisberg 
aggregates evidence for this position from a wide range of methodologies, including 
experiments, verbal protocol analysis and the re-analysis of innovations cast by some as 
involving sudden insight in terms of a conjectured set of inferences based on local analogies 
and prior knowledge (e.g., da Vinci’s aerial screw). Perhaps closer still to the position we 
advocate here is the notion of ‘data-driven’ restructuring in insight problem solving offered in 
Fleck and Weisberg (2013): By this they mean that restructuring occurs in response to an 
observed change in the environment caused by the reasoning agent or capitalizing on a 
serendipitous re-arrangement produced by extraneous causes. It is worth noting that in Fleck 
and Weisberg (2013), data-driven restructuring is more likely to occur with problems 
presented to participants that involve the manipulation of actual artefacts (e.g., the triangle of 
coins problem; Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). 
First Order Problem Solving in the Lab 
We recently examined how participants solved a so-called insight problem: how to 
distribute 17 animals in four enclosures such that each enclosure contains an odd number of 
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animals. On the surface, the problem masquerades as a simple arithmetic one; however, no 
combination of four odd numbers can sum to 17. The challenge then is to abandon this 
arithmetic interpretation and work on the spatial arrangements of the enclosures in order to 
exploit set intersections. In a series of experiments (Vallée-Tourangeau, Steffensen, Vallée-
Tourangeau, & Sirota, 2016) we observed participants working on a solution for a period of 
10 minutes in one of two task environments that differed in the tools available and the type of 
interactivity. Participants in one environment were given an electronic tablet and a stylus 
with which to sketch a solution. In the first of two experiments, no participant solved the 
problem, in a second 17% did. With a stylus, participants are encouraged to write whole 
numbers—as opposed to make individuated marks corresponding to the animals—labouring 
an impossible arithmetic solution. Equally important, once pens were drawn, often as crosses 
that created quadrants on the middle of the tablet, pens were rarely re-drawn. Thus, the 
common pen configuration reinforced the misleading arithmetic interpretation, and their 
static nature suggested that they were rarely if ever the focus of attention. In sum, the tools 
and actions afforded by this ecosystem were more likely to perpetuate the incorrect 
interpretation of the problem which reinforced a stale problem-solving strategy.  
In a second condition, participants were invited to build a solution of the problem with 
pipe cleaners and 17 animal figurines; they were not given pen or stylus, paper or electronic 
tablet, with which to sketch a solution. The model building environment configures a very 
different cognitive ecosystem. For one, participants cannot easily manipulate explicit number 
symbols, and as a result the quixotic iterative search of which four odd numbers can add to 
17 is much less likely. Second, participants must construct pens and their activity initially 
focuses on the key element of the problem, namely the shape and spatial arrangements of the 
pens. Participants in both conditions read the same problem description, yet the different 
tools and action possibilities facilitate very different problem solving strategies. In the model 
building environment, over 40% of the participants produced a working model of the solution 
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in the allocated 10 minutes with an additional 15% building proto-solutions involving 
intersecting enclosures. Building a model of the solution helped participants to abandon an 
unproductive arithmetic interpretation of problem. However, interactivity weaves a path, and 
the artefacts provided sometimes cued participants to perform actions that lead to a cul-de-
sac. For example, a few built tagliatelle-type nests for the enclosures, presumably to prevent 
the animals from jumping over. In one of the experiments, the figurines employed were 
zebra-shaped paper clips, and a few participants took advantage of this affordance and 
clipped animals onto the pipe cleaning pieces. Building high nests and clipping animals to the 
perimeters of enclosures created perspectives which ruled out envisaging an overlapping set 
solution. The point is that a participant’s problem-solving trajectory is singular and 
contingent. Because action possibilities depend on previous results, it becomes particularly 
important to examine detailed video evidence on a case by case basis, in order to understand 
how each participant manages to build a working model. 
We profiled participants in both conditions in terms of their working memory 
capacity—computational and visuo-spatial span tests courtesy of the Randall Engle lab at 
Georgia Tech—as well as their thinking dispositions using the short version of an actively 
open-minded thinking scale (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013) and the need for cognition scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) to gauge their openness to new ideas, willingness to abandon 
discredited ones, and attitudes towards effortful cognition (such as enjoying challenging 
puzzles). Since participants were randomly allocated to either the tablet or the model building 
condition, we expected no difference between conditions in terms of these psychometric 
dimensions, and indeed there were none. Thus, participants who failed to produce a solution 
to the 17 animals problem had the same working memory capacity and the same thinking 
dispositions as those in the model building condition. In the model building condition we also 
compared participants who built a working model of the solution with those who failed: None 
of the psychometric variables predicted problem solving success. Still, these psychometric 
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observations must be interpreted cautiously in light of the modest sample from which they 
were made. 
Theoretical concepts traditionally offered to explain problem solving performance in 
terms of features internal to the reasoner failed to account for any of the variance in our 
experiment. Rather, to understand how successful problem solving performance comes about, 
it makes more sense to refocus research onto the cognitive ecosystem within which solutions 
are enacted and through which a solution-probing path is woven contingently. Insight is 
connected, not so much to a new way of looking at a problem, but to a new way a problem 
can look once its physical appearance has been shaped and reshaped through interactivity.  
Yet, problem solving research in psychology proceeds under the aegis of a 
psychometric model that assumes problem solving to be a mental phenomenon concerned 
with the transformation of mental representations (e.g., representations of the problem, the 
initial state, the goal state). People vary in the cognitive capacities that facilitate the 
transformations of mental representations: A mind that is better at simultaneously holding 
and manipulating many elements of a problem representation will be more adept at solving 
problems. The psychometric model is bolstered and emboldened by correlations that 
evidence a link between generic cognitive capacities and problem-solving performance, 
whether of the insight or non-insight kind. This assumption is in turn motivated by a tacit 
commitment to methodological individualism: Thinking and insight are mental phenomena 
that require explanations in terms of mental operations that occur within an individual, or 
more specifically within an individual’s head. As a consequence, the situated and interactive 
character of thinking is neglected. 
The psychology of problem solving has been largely indifferent to the development of 
ideas in philosophy and cognitive science in terms of extended minds, situated and 
distributed cognition (e.g., the 4E perspective on cognition; Gallagher, 2018). Yet, beyond 
the methodological confines of the psychologist’s laboratory, it does not require much 
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ethnographic effort to notice that people think with their hands, their body, and a wide range 
of disparate artifacts. External resources are recruited, configuring extended cognitive 
systems that scaffold thinking and reasoning. Interaction with the physical environment is a 
key feature of thinking outside the laboratory.  
Problem solving is dynamic and distributed, enacted spatio-temporarily. It is an 
interactive process that engages a wide range of resources, such as artefacts, people, even 
galaxies (e.g., as gravitational lenses). Both science and art are problem solving activities that 
trace paths that are deeply contingent, dotted with interim stages, proto-solutions and 
preliminary models. These interim products are boundary objects that bind but also transform 
actions and people in enacting the problem solving itinerary. To better understand the genesis 
of insight, of new ideas, of new forms, one should examine carefully, on the basis of detailed 
case studies, the conditions from which these forms emerge. In the laboratory this can be 
achieved only through a detailed qualitative analysis of a participant’s action as he or she 
works within an ecosystem that affords the physical manipulation of the problem. For 
example, Steffensen et al. (2016) conducted a detailed analysis of the video recording (over 
1200 annotations for a 10-minute session) of a single participant successfully solving the 17 
animals problem. During the first two minutes, the participant spent time building enclosures. 
In the process, she occasionally created overlapping pens which she would promptly 
disassemble in order to maintain a configuration of 4 separate enclosures. The participant 
spent four minutes trying to distribute the 17 figurines into these separated pens in her 
attempts to find a solution. Frustrated with her inability to crack the problem, the participant 
placed all the animals in a heap in the middle of the work surface and focused her attention 
on the pens themselves. While fiddling with the shape of one enclosure, she accidentally 
created an overlap. She began to remove it but stopped just as she was about to touch one of 
the pens (a moment termed the ‘event pivot’). Then, instead of undoing the overlap, she 
created another two intersections by moving the two remaining pens. With these three 
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overlapping areas, she had achieved a configuration that cued some interesting possibilities 
for her; possibilities that were not available to her earlier in the session. Accordingly, she 
now proceeded to distribute the animals to match the odd number constraint.  
When did she solve the problem? She solved it when she constructed a working model 
of the solution. Did she solve it when she produced overlapping sets? We would argue that 
she did not, but rather sought encouragement from this new arrangement and began 
systematically working at populating this new enclosure configuration. Her actions in the first 
6 minutes of the session appeared to be guided by a plan that was determined by a misleading 
arithmetic interpretation of the problem. But her actions at the event pivot did not reflect a 
plan. At the point when she took advantage of an overlap, it was her actions that distilled a 
plan. That is, a working solution was enacted rather than mentally simulated. Her solution 
arises out of a contingent path that initially takes her through her failed attempts to distribute 
her flock into separate pens followed by an accidental overlap that was opportunistically 
seized and exploited to drive new distribution efforts. The event pivot at the 6-minute mark is 
an important discontinuity but the significance of the overlap was noticed only at a certain 
point in the trajectory; earlier accidental overlaps were undone. Thus, we can understand her 
success from a contingent-historical perspective of failures and adjustments. The physical 
model was constructed into a working solution, but it is incorrect to say that the construction 
reflected the implementation of a plan.  
Creative Problem Solving with Clay 
In the first part of the paper we make a distinction between first and second-order 
problem solving. In first-order efforts, the problem-solver comes to a solution directly by 
manipulating the world. In turn, second order problem solving forces the problem-solver to 
find a solution using mental resources alone. We have presented experimental evidence to 
show that, when given an option, participants change second-order situations into first-order 
ones and, in so doing, demonstrate more problem-solving success. However, it is the nature 
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of experimental design (in which two or more variables are shown to have differential effects 
on a particular outcome) that it necessarily constrains explanations to those based upon linear 
causation. Whereas the experimental evidence we have cited shows that it is possible to 
construct experimental situations that are sensitive to the effects of physical interaction, the 
demonstrated relationship remains linear. This does not necessarily reflect the way creative 
problem-solving occurs in an extended, ecologically realistic situation. 
The situated and distributed character of problem solving in the wild is clearly 
illustrated in the work of Lave (1988) and Hutchins (1995). The challenges faced by the 
psychometric paradigm to explain creative problem solving come sharply into focus as we 
scale up from experimental research in the laboratory, to problem solving in professional and 
creative domains of science and art. A professional creative agent (qua designer, molecular 
biologist, or sculptor) may toil for days, months or years on a client’s brief, an engineering 
problem, or a large-scale clay sculptural installation. This form of creative problem solving 
unfolds in time and space, within a network of cultural practices - often resulting in a long 
trail of interim artefacts (such as sketches, models and prototypes). Clearly these agents can 
be profiled along psychometric dimensions, but the creative arc is complex, shaped by 
processes operating in different temporal dimensions; it is profoundly and unpredictably 
contingent. 
In the second half of the paper we shift perspective and narrative voice from a 
nomothetic commentary on an internalist model of  creative problem solving to one of the 
author’s subjective commentary on the creative arc traced in the production of a large clay 
sculptural installation entitled Claustra (see Figure 1). This commentary augments and 
complements the critical analysis offered in the first part of the paper, but also underscores 
the artist as a situated agent by detailing the creative, cognitive and cultural ecosystem within 
which an artist enacts a work of art. The ontological position that this phenomenological 
approach presents can be summarized in terms of four main observations. First, a short-term 
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analysis of the process of creativity tends towards a description that links an idea (cause) with 
an effect (art-work). This case study shows how a longer-term analysis embeds the art-work 
in a network of interconnecting arcs of influence, making creativity part of work-practice. 
Second, the chronological experience of time can be disrupted. If the development of a work 
of art is seen as a journey, then the journey is not always experienced chronologically - time’s 
arrow can sometimes feel as though it is pointing backwards. Third, although cranial activity 
is causally associated with creative acts, the locus of creativity is not to be found in a brain 
isolated from its environment but in the interactive movement of hand and material. 
Creativity and cognition are not neural entities, they are culturally informed, subjective 
experiences arising out of the formation of provisional systems. Fourth, contrary to a 
mentalist interpretation, the experience of insight or what is known as a “lightbulb moment” 
is often an indication that something new, unusual and interesting has just happened in the 
world. It therefore seems more appropriate to replace the term ‘insight’ with ‘outsight’2.  
--------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
--------------------------- 
It is clear that, as a subjective account, this commentary cannot provide an objectively 
valid description of the process of creativity. While accepting this shortcoming, we will 
return to it in our conclusions in order to make an argument for the value of such accounts. 
For the moment it is enough to say that we do not cite the case-study as proof for our concept 
of outsight. Nor do we wish to suggest that the working practice therein described is 
representative of artists in general. The point of the case study is to offer a systemic analysis 
of the process of creativity. By giving a description based upon interconnected spirals of 
                                               
2 Oxford Dictionary defines outsight as a “Vision or perception of external things; the capacity to see or 
observe; (the ability to take) an overview.” We suggest reformulating “Outsight” to mean instead “arrive at an 
understanding or a solution of a complicated problem or situation while observing or manipulating the external 
world.” 
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cognitive experiences and physical transformations we hope to show that it is reasonable to 
reformulate the concept of insight as outsight. Rather than trying to prove the existence of 
outsight, our aims are more modest. We wish to show that outsight provides a plausible 
description of a complex, real-world example of creative problem-solving in which thinking, 
action and material are inseparably linked. Change the material and you change the very 
process of thinking itself. We wish to demonstrate that future empirical work needs to be 
sensitive to the transactional coupling between cognition and material.  
Beyond the Hylomorphic Genesis of Art 
An information processing approach to artistic creation suggests that a work of art is a 
material realisation of one or more ideas or internal images (e.g., Boden, 2004). This view of 
creative activity is called “hylomorphism” and involves the separation of things in the 
physical world into the matter (hyle) of which they are made and the form (morphe) such 
matter takes. Once form is abstracted from material it can be representationally stored. This 
philosophical position has a long history dating back to Aristotle. Seen like this, art has a 
useful representational role: It makes the internal world of the artist accessible to others. And 
if we wish to explore the origins of an art-work, it enables us to begin the story with the birth 
of a creative idea before turning a retrospective gaze on the personality of the artist and its 
manifestation in the artwork. This position seems reasonable. It is consistent with how art is 
taught in schools and it is underwritten by one of the most influential recent movements 
within the art world, conceptual art. It also seems to chime with subjective experience: For 
example, while running a clay workshop for children, one of the authors noticed how, from 
time to time, children as young as seven or eight years old would remain frozen in front of a 
lump of clay, complaining that they did not know how to start because they did not have any 
ideas. The children's remarks imply that the idea behind an artwork provides us with 
intention. Having an idea allows us to pass into action. Without an idea we do not know what 
we are doing and so we do nothing at all. If the activity of the brain is seen as something that 
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happens separately from the activity of the world then a concept such as ‘intention’ becomes 
necessary to explain how brain activity can have an external influence (Latour, 1999). It is 
our contention that, by adding context, by embedding a particular creative act within an 
ongoing process of artistic creation, a model of creation based upon linear causation becomes 
impossible. Instead a more confusing, messy, systemic pattern emerges. In order to render 
things more comprehensible we divide the second half of the paper into four sections; we 
move also to a first-person account.  
Symmetry 
An art-work does not normally occur in isolation but as part of a process of ongoing 
artistic activity. Claustra was preceded by a series of sculptures (Substantia Innominata, 
2014; see Figure 2). Each sculpture was both highly structured and yet perceptually 
indeterminate, giving the impression that there was something to recognise without the 
sculpture ever settling into an acceptable thing in the eye of the beholder.  
--------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
--------------------------- 
While making these pieces, symmetry emerged as a way of giving structure to 
otherwise indeterminable shapes. In addition, I found I could extend the uncertainty about my 
relationship with these emerging forms and their relationship with each other by creating 
each half, side by side, only bringing them together at the end. Working this way, I noticed 
that the halves had a very different relationship with each other as separate pieces compared 
with when they were unified. In particular, separately they created a space between them that 
became a quasi-thing in itself (see Casati & Varzi, 1994, for a description of the object-status 
of holes). As the series progressed, I found it increasingly difficult to bring the pieces 
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together. They seemed to prefer to be separate. Perhaps this resistance marks the beginnings 
of Claustra3.  
Perceiving the space between the symmetrical parts as a quasi-thing was a discovery 
that I made while observing the changing juxtaposition of the parts themselves. There was no 
pre-existing idea or concept that I wished to make manifest. It manifested itself to me. The 
change of mind emerges from the repetitive rhythm of action and reaction. The separated 
symmetry of Claustra is ontogenetically continuous, an example of what Marion Milner 
(1950) calls “contemplative action”. When the nascent Claustra is experienced as a change in 
work-practice rather than as a creative idea, I become a participant-observer in an ongoing 
reconfiguration of my surroundings. It feels like I am part of an evolving collaboration. But 
after the event, when I am not longer making, it becomes more of a struggle to describe 
things in these terms. In the absence of clay as a dynamic, material substrate, the memory of 
creative change becomes isolated and abstracted from the making process and Claustra 
begins to appear to be the outcome of an antecedent concept or idea.4 
Whereas the sculpting process undoubtedly involves considerable mental activity it 
does not follow that the locus of creativity is cerebral. The above description suggests not 
only that the creativity has an extracorporeal spatial coordinate but that its locus goes beyond 
the dimension of space. It exists in an experiential dimension in which time, space and 
creative change are reciprocally co-constructed. From a subjective point of view, space is not 
                                               
3 The artist experienced the sculptures-in-formation as though they had feelings and intentions. What we suggest 
this indicates is that the creative activity is being guided by environmental influences over which the artist feels 
he has limited agency. 
4 The point we would emphasise here is the contrast the artist is making between how the creative process feels 
in the presence of a dynamic material such as clay and how it appears in retrospect when the influence of the 
creative environment is no longer present. 
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a pre-existing container, vacant until I fill it with a sculpture, subjective space is created 
along with the sculpture5.  
Haytor, the Vogelherd Lion (and the Jura) 
The most conspicuous geological feature of Dartmoor (Devon, UK) is its granite 
outcrops known as Tors. Sculpted by the erosion of wind and rain they take up extraordinary 
and beautiful forms. Haytor is a particular fine example (see Figure 3). 
 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 here 
------------------------- 
One day, while sculpting, something about the shape of the clay reminded me of 
Haytor. Or rather, a memories of Haytor were influencing the emerging clay form while 
simultaneously being brought forth by the clay itself. As Høffding and Martigny (2016) point 
out, memories are not static records of the past like photos in an album. To bring to mind 
something from the past is to have a new, unique experience in the present. From the window 
of my workshop in Geneva I can see the Jura Mountains (see Figure 4) but I cannot see 
Haytor. By bringing up an image of the Tor on my computer I now had Haytor in front of me 
with the Jura beyond.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 here 
------------------------- 
Named after the cave in the Swabian Jura (Southwest Germany) in which it was found, 
the Vogelherd Lion is a small, Palaeolithic sculpture carved from mammoth ivory. On the 
windowsill of my workshop, between the image of Haytor and the Jura Mountains, stood a 
                                               
5 This paragraph expresses the central argument of our paper. It concerns whether creativity and problem-solving 
activity are understood and studied as emergent properties of the brain or as phenomenological constructs. 
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replica of the Vogelherd Lion (see Figure 5) that I had ordered from Ebay some months 
earlier for similar reasons that I had brought up the photo of Haytor on my screen. Something 
in the work I had been doing at the time prompted a memory of it. Until the two (or three 
including the Jura Mountains in the background) were brought together within my gaze, I had 
not considered joining them in a project. Now in an “aha!” moment I saw that Haytor and the 
lion had similar forms and yet, by transposing one upon the other something new could 
emerge. While this appears to be an example of insight, given that it took place out there, in 
plain view, it is perhaps better described as “outsight”6.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 here 
------------------------ 
The Jali Screen 
In 2013 I made a large ceramic sculpture called Extended Phenotype 4 (see Figure 6, 
left panel). To lend support during construction, I created an internal clay “scaffolding” 
which was hidden inside once the finished piece was fired and reconstructed (see Figure 6, 
right panel). The scaffolding was serious, efficient and workmanlike but it also had a 
touchingly naive aspect to it. The interplay between these two, conflicting impressions gave it 
both force and appeal which I was sorry to have to hide from view.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 6 here 
------------------------- 
                                               
6 It is important to note that our use of the word “outsight” does not imply a reversal in the polarity of agency 
nor of intention. There is an interaction going on. The artist played his part in constructing the environment in 
which he works, placing artefacts on the windowsill, working while facing the mountains etc. And, of course, 
the direction of his gaze determines what he sees. Our use of the word “outsight” implies a greater flexibility 
about what we mean by “cognitive”. Internalist models of insight equate processing with neural processing. We, 
along with Malafouris (2013), are proposing that environmental changes should be included as part of the 
process of cognition. 
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The feeling of sorrow meant that, as the Claustra project began to take shape, it did so, 
perhaps, with the tacit acceptance that the scaffolding of Phenotype 4 would rematerialize to 
provide visible support to the “cut” walls of Claustra. As such, although I hoped that the 
juxtaposition of rock-like surface and naive-but-functional scaffolding would create a bizarre 
yet coherent tension, in reality, I had no idea what the two different formations would make 
of each other. I therefore made a small model of the entire structure not only to investigate 
the specific interplay between scaffolding and rock-face but also to think about the overall 
proportions and structure of the two pieces and the relation between them (see Figure 7). 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7 here 
------------------------- 
The function of the model was not to make manifest a foregoing internal image of an 
artwork. Nor was it intended as a miniature version of the final work any more than a map is 
a version of a particular territory. Like a map, a model helps to orient exploration. It pinpoints 
the location of some significant landmarks, while leaving the terrain in-between largely 
unknown. Making a model is an important transformative stage, creating certain constraints 
which, while not determinant, served to provide some structural stability. In so doing a model 
paradoxically creates the freedom to take risks and thus make discoveries that would be 
impossible in a completely unconstrained environment7.  
With regard to exposing the relationship between scaffolding and rock-face, the model 
suggested a certain antagonism between the two which I can only describe in the following 
metaphorically animistic terms. “The well-executed stone surface took exception to the 
rudimentary and primitive construction of the scaffolding.” I was surprised because it was 
                                               
7 Here the artist describes his use of a model in terms that are similar to Kirsh’s notion of cognitive scaffolding. 
Unlike the rest of the artist’s narrative the implicit notion of the model as a cognitive tool brings environmental 
change into the intentional dominion of the artist. 
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exactly this juxtaposition that had appealed to me when looking at the relationship between 
the support system for Extended Phenotype 4 and the organic/mineral external body of the 
piece. To investigate further, I began the construction of a full-size model of two sections of 
the sculpture (see Figure 8). 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 8 here 
------------------------- 
I constructed the matrix of the lower section in a reasonably precise manner before 
returning to a more naïve-but-functional construction for the upper section. Comparing the 
two I found that, unlike the naive version, the precisely made matrix suggested a rhythm, 
mystery and strange formality that lived in happy yet contradictory coexistence with the rock 
surface. I began the construction of the final, full-scale version in this careful and precise 
way. As I did so, the work brought to mind the perforated ornamental screens or ‘Jali` that 
are found in Indian and Islamic architecture (Mashrabiya). As the word “latticework” 
replaced “scaffolding” as a description of my perception of the structure, the work began to 
create similar paradoxical separations that one finds in Mosques, cloisters or in the 
confession box (see Figure 9).  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 9 here 
------------------------- 
I was aware of no prior intention to refer to Islamic or Indian architecture or to the 
confession box. The association between material structure and religious conceptualisation 
developed only as I manipulated the sculpture. Nonetheless, when an exciting act of 
creativity like this takes place between my hands, I am tempted to take the credit for it. This 
act of self-affirmation (referred to in social psychology as the “self-serving bias” e.g. 
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Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004) requires the development of a hylomorphic 
attitude in which agency becomes a property of the person rather than the system8.  
Rotating the Cut 
Quite early in the development of the project, I recalled seeing an installation many 
years before by Damien Hirst, Prodigal Son (1994). It presents the body of a dead calf, cut 
along its longitudinal axis, each half placed in a tank of formaldehyde with the two tanks 
positioned opposite each other. I cannot now remember whether it had been possible to walk 
in the space between the two tanks or whether I had merely thought that it would have been 
good if it had been possible. Either way, my recollection of Prodigal Son came with the 
conviction that my experience (real or invented) of being between the two tanks must have 
been instrumental in the genesis of Claustra. But this assumption flew in the face of the order 
of events: it was the ongoing work on Claustra that brought Prodigal Son to mind, not visa-
versa. I have written elsewhere (March, 2017) about this paradoxical phenomenon whereby 
elements that are felt to have inspired a work are not present at its conception, but emerge 
instead during the course of its development. It is as though the emerging work brings its own 
antecedents into being. Normally when this happens, it is swiftly followed by a re-
experiencing of the genesis of the work, this time with its origins in their so-called proper, 
chronological order. Despite the sense of history re-writing itself, I suspect that the re-
ordering of experience has less to do with putting things in the correct order and more to do 
with the influence of a pervasive ontological view predicated upon cause and effect. Within 
this view, effect never precedes cause9.  
                                               
8 The artist describes two events that surprise him: first, the lack of coherence between the rock formation and 
naïve scaffolding and second, the reference to religious architecture. Surprise suggests an unexpected turn of 
events which in term suggests a predictive failure. We can understand this in terms of the artists’s dual role as 
participant-observer and a relative move away from participation towards observation.  
9 The point here is that the notion of causative antecedents has little place in a cognitive system that includes a 
material environment because the structure of influence is, by definition circular rather than linear. The process 
that Malafouris (2013) calls “Enactive Signification” adroitly captures the formation of instantaneous circles of 
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Hirst positions the two cut sides of Prodigal Son facing each other. When the 
installation came to mind in the context of Claustra, the thought included the implicit 
assumption that Claustra too would be oriented in the same fashion. However, in order to 
build the ‘rock’ sides of Claustra in a symmetrical manner, it was necessary to position those 
two sides facing each other so that I could see and have access to both simultaneously. This 
arrangement encouraged me to work in an unexpected way. After having initially built up the 
rough shape of each side separately (in series) I began to work on both sides simultaneously. 
Standing between the two sides, astride the axis of symmetry, I would place each hand on 
equivalent parts of the two rock faces and sculpt use mirrored gestures, often with my eyes 
shut, in order to better feel the symmetry through my fingers.  
Symmetry was not something that was imposed. It developed in the following way. 
One side (A) might look and feel more appealing than the other (B). In response, I would 
concentrate on B, bringing it closer to the form of A. But during its transformation, B might 
take on a form that went beyond that of A. In response, returning to A, I would try to steer it 
towards B and so on: the two sides of the installation nudging each other backwards and 
forwards towards their final composition – each serving as a dynamic reference for the other. 
As such, my role was not one of instigator or initiator. Rather, I was part of a decision 
making body that included the ever changing morphology of the clay. As with the lump of 
clay I mentioned earlier that referred to Haytor, the morphology of Claustra makes 
references to other things. But this is not the same as representing other things. The creative 
system that I am calling Claustra, and which included the actions of my body, brought itself 
about. It is a re-presentation neither of an existing structure nor of a pre-conception.  
Once the two halves were complete I left them with the rock surfaces facing each other 
while they dried. I am not sure at what point this orientation came to be that of the final 
                                               
influence in which the concept is conceived of only at the moment of materialisation; the signifier and the 
signified arise simultaneously. 
INSIGHT OUT 27 
installation in the exhibition. The two structures had spent several months growing and 
developing in this position and I had spent much of that time between the two of them with 
my hands upon both. This left the thought of rotating the two halves to bring them into line 
with Prodigal Son difficult to entertain. Of course, once the sections were fired I could 
physically compare the two options. Doing so left me in no doubt that the exhibition 
positioning should follow the construction orientation. 
Conclusions  
It might be argued that our suggestion to replace “insight” with “outsight” as a 
description of a moment of problem resolution or of creative discovery does nothing more 
than change the direction of a linear model of causation from one that formerly had mental 
activity determining external activity to the reverse. We hope that it is clear both from the 
experimental material we have presented as well as the case study that this was not our 
intention. Rather, we have put forward a systemic, interactional model in which the question 
of the origin of causation becomes irrelevant. By concentrating on the process of creative 
problem-solving in relation to the manipulation of material things we do not wish to 
minimise the importance of cerebral activity. Rather, by redefining “outsight” and promoting 
it as an alternative to “insight” we wish to draw attention to the fact that real-world problem 
solving can never be properly understood by divorcing it from the real world within which it 
not only occurs but also has a hand in creating and influencing.  
To achieve this, we have taken a two-pronged approach. First, by reconfiguring the 
traditional insight problem solving research procedure with physical models of the problem, 
we illustrate how eagerly participants embrace the opportunity to use artefacts to resolve 
problems successfully that were beyond the scope of their internal resources alone. We are 
not claiming that humans have no capacity for mental simulation nor that it cannot be used in 
a problem-solving task. Clearly second order problem solving, based on abstract 
representations of the world, is not only possible but is routinely encountered in laboratory 
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environments. In addition, much psychometric research in occupational psychology profiles 
people’s ability to solve problems this way, with important employability implications. 
Instead, we argue, along with Clarke (2010), that participants engage in isolated mental 
activity only if they are prevented from being in real-time relation with the world. Of course, 
one might argue that by changing, for example, the socks riddle into a physical model we are 
simply removing a tricky problem and replacing it with a simple sorting task. But that which 
is unknown remains the same, and rather than simulating different permutations and deriving 
the consequences of misleading odds information, the problem solver simply gets to work, 
with the world, to arrive at a satisfying answer. It is the coupling with the world that enhances 
creative problem solving.  
A reviewer pointed out that some insight problem solving research under laboratory 
conditions employ problems that might be candidates for first order problem solving as we 
define it here. The 9-dot problem is a case in point. This is an interesting problem although 
important elements of that problem remain static. The 9-dot problem seems to us to be more 
first order but not completely first order. Partly because the page on which it exists can be 
both a real space and a virtual space so the domain of what is part of the problem and what 
lies beyond it is ambiguous. More important, the fact that it is difficult to solve is not 
evidence against the advantages of being able to interact with a model. It is a difficult 
problem which would be made even more difficult if it was turned into a pure second order 
task (imagining the 9 dots and the lines through them or preventing participants from using 
their hands or fingers to trace imaginary patterns). More generally, interactivity is not a 
panacea, and some problems however reified into a physical model, remain difficult to solve. 
There is also research that illustrates how the impact of interactivity is moderated by 
individual differences: For example, basic arithmetic skills, working memory capacity or 
mathematics anxiety moderate the impact of interactivity on mental arithmetic performance 
(e.g., Guthrie & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2018). What is important to note, though, is that when 
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second order problems are turned into first order problems (by offering participants the 
opportunity to manipulate and transform a physical model of the problem), problem solving 
performance is dramatically transformed (for both analytic and so-called insight problems). 
In addition to the illustration offered in the current manuscript with the 17 animals problem, 
this was demonstrated with matchstick algebra problems (Weller, Villejoubert & Vallee-
Tourangeau, 2011) and the cheap necklace problem (Henok, Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2018).  In Fleck and Weisberg (2013), insight problems presented with material 
artefacts are solved differently from those without, although this is an aspect of their 
procedure that draws no commentary from these researchers (Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). The 
scaffolding properties of interactivity have also been established for a range of transformation 
or analytic problems, including river crossing (Guthrie, Vallee-Tourangeau, Vallee-
Tourangeau, & Howard, 2015), Luchins’s water jars (Vallee-Tourangeau, Euden, & Hearn, 
2011), mental arithmetic (Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013), Bayesian reasoning (Vallée-
Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015), and anagrams (Ross & Vallée-
Tourangeau, under review).  
It is also worth noting that the pioneering work on the psychology of insight problem 
solving in the first few decades of the 20th Century involved participants (and in the case of 
Köhler’s ethnographic research, chimpanzees) working on problems that were presented with 
various objects and involved physical interaction. However, neither Duncker nor Maier 
emphasised the constitutive role of interactivity in the genesis of the solution. Duncker 
(1945) investigated functional fixedness and compared solution rates between conditions 
involving pre-utilization (boxes filled with other objects, such as matches) or without pre-
utilization (empty boxes). Duncker’s analysis did not focus on actions leading to a solution 
and his theoretical account was formulated to offer a sharp contrast with behaviourist and 
associative models of problem solving. Having said this, there are passages in section 8 of 
Duncker (1945) where he discusses the importance of “varied commerce with things” and 
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reports a series of “stick experiments with infants” (pp. 69-71) to “illustrate the importance of 
varied commerce with things and situations for problem solving” (p. 71). The stick was used 
to retrieve ‘some attractive object’ only after a series of chance contacts between the stick 
and the object. Thus, some goal-driven behaviour in infants evolves from experiencing the 
positive results of random movements. In Maier’s (1931) paper on the two-string problem, 
his research focus was on hints, not on how interactivity distilled a solution. 
In the second section of our binary approach, we offer a detailed demonstration of how 
creative decision making can be seen to be embedded in the process of material change by 
presenting a subjective account from an artist in the process of an extended creative 
engagement. In this account we suggest that the focus on symmetry becomes 
deconceptualized by considering it in its historical context. In addition, the recursive 
relationship between the process of finding symmetry and of the final morphology 
undermines explanations of the creative process that describe art as serving a representative 
role for something that lies beyond the system of production. 
Likewise, descriptions of the transposition of Haytor and the Vogelherd Lion and of the 
evolution of scaffolding into latticework both undermine explanations of creation that are 
couched in terms of insight. It is our contention that an appreciation of the decision-making 
process in its physical and historical context provides a strong argument for the importance of 
a reciprocal relationship with material in relation to artistic practice. 
The credibility of our argument depends upon the status of the subjective account from 
which it is drawn. As mentioned earlier, subjective accounts by definition do not provide 
objectively verifiable material. Despite this, we think such accounts have much to offer for 
creativity research. This is not the place to present an exhaustive review of the place of 
subjectivity in the study of creativity and so we will limit ourselves to four points.  
(1) The case-study narrative embeds creative change in a series of step-wise, externally 
observable, cognitive-environmental transformations. Although the artist, Paul March 
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believes that the process of artistic creation occurred in the course of these steps, it is not 
necessary to accept that the artist’s beliefs are correct in every detail. We seek only to 
establish that it is plausible that the phenomenon called insight might be better understood by 
looking for similar step-wise shifts in the cognitive-environmental architecture of a problem-
solving situation. Thus, it is not the specific steps that are crucial but the nature of the 
transformative process itself that we wish to highlight. In Pandora’s Hope Latour (1999, 
chapters 4 and 5) uses a case study to explore, reveal and describe the nature of the scientific 
process. In our description of the artistic process we proceed in an analogous way to Latour’s 
description of Pasteur’s work on lactic fermentation. Like Latour, by taking a step-by-step 
approach and by anchoring each step in material transformation, we hope to avoid the 
situation in which objective and subjective accounts find themselves in opposition. Like the 
argument made by Latour, the approach is not objective in the sense that it provides a 
scientifically valid outcome, but it is empirical in the sense that the account is constructed 
around the existence of observable artefacts (drawings, models, photos etc.). The reader can 
check the artist’s interpretations by referring to one of more of the images of these artefacts.  
(2) We wholeheartedly agree with the endeavour to provide an objective account of the 
process of creativity and its appreciation. Indeed, the first half of the paper attempts to do just 
that. But creativity is also a subjective and experiential activity. The materially-embedded 
phenomenological approach that we use in the second half of the paper is one attempt to 
capture something of the creative experience itself. We are not claiming that a 
phenomenological account is better than an experimental account. We see the two as 
complementary. One seeks validity whereas the other captures and highlights aspects of 
creative change that may be worthy of future exploration or even validation. Finally, within 
the domain of qualitative research, the sort of analysis that can be provided by a first-person 
account is of a different order from those studies that have interviewed artists about the 
creative process. Once again, we are not suggesting that one is better than the other. Rather, 
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by reading this account alongside, for example, the recent paper by Sawyer (2018, in this 
journal) we can begin to understand the extent to which artists are using art-making as a 
meta-activity, that is, as a way of understanding the process of art-making itself. Of course, 
even if this is true of some artistic activity, there is no reason to believe that it is true of all of 
the arts, let alone creative activity in general. What we think this case study does do is to 
highlight the notion that the process of creation has the potential for being a self-conscious 
endeavour or a meta-activity. By this we mean that art-making has the capacity to investigate 
its own process. Indeed, within art history circles, this self-consciousness is seen as one of the 
principle ways in which the modernist movement separated itself from classical art (e.g., 
Hughes, 1980). Thus, not only is this meta-creativity important to study as part of the creative 
act, the study of creation itself will be greatly enhanced by collaborating more with working 
artists.  
(3) The case study is constructed around the emergence of a series of material artefacts. 
The narrative respects and follows the chronology of these appearances. The commentary by 
the artist is temporally linked with each artefact and his reports of cognitive states are 
likewise linked either to the material transformation within an artefact or across one or more 
artefacts. These descriptions should not therefore be misconstrued as introspections, making 
reference to the unverifiable workings of an inner mind. Quite the reverse, they are comments 
concerning the processes of an extended and visible mind at work. By providing images of 
the various artefacts together with a description of how they are related, the reader has the 
evidence to make a judgement, not about whether the story is true, but about whether the 
story can account for the facts. In our view the story describes the process of creation with a 
parsimony and transparency that is simply not available to descriptions that are based on the 
workings of an internal mind. A similar approach has been developed by within the field of 
Postphenomenology by Rosenberger and Verbeek (2015; see below).  
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(4) The use of artefacts to support or scaffold an argument or interpretation is routinely 
used in other disciplines, namely Archaeology and Anthropology. In particular, within the 
domain of material culture, the study of the behaviour of things in relation to people is central 
to understanding both the development of culture (see Lucas 2010 for an overview) and of 
cognition (see for example the Material Engagement Theory of Malafouris, 2013). In 
addition, over the last 25 years, a phenomenological approach to the study of material culture 
has developed (see Thomas, 2006, for an overview) 
From a philosophical perspective, Idhe (2009) has developed Heidegger’s ontological 
position into a postphenomenological account of the humans-technology interface. Ihde and 
others (e.g. Rosenberger and Verbeek, 2015) have developed a case-study methodology 
based upon first-person accounts and self-conducted studies in order to understand how 
technology and humans co-construct subjective experience. Rosenberger and Verbeek (2015) 
describe the postphenomenological method as “empirical philosophy”: by which they mean 
that, by focusing on the co-constructed relationship between human and technology, they can 
transform the metaphysical into something physical and thus available for empirical 
investigation.  
There is no denying that the approaches that have developed from material culture and 
from phenomenology take a radically different ontological position from the one traditionally 
held within the cognitive sciences. For example, Postphenomenology and Material 
Engagement Theory both argue that the human-world relationship is one in which mind and 
material are ontologically linked in a relational, recursive and creative ecology. Second, both 
emphasize the importance of the role of practice and experience over that of internal 
representations (Ihde and Malafouris, 2018). It seems to us that the developing distributed 
cognition movement within the cognitive sciences has much in common with the material 
culture approach. Our motivation is to create and develop multidisciplinary links between 
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scholars working in different fields, with different methodologies but with the same 
ontological allegiances.  
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Figure 1. Claustra; stoneware 1.8 x 2.0 x 1.8 m, 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 1. Claustra; stoneware 1.8 x 2.0 x 1.8 m, 2015. 
INSIGHT OUT 41 
Figure 2. Substantia Innominata, III stoneware 0.3 x 0.4 x 0.2 m, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Substantia Innominata, III stoneware 0.3 x 0.4 x 0.2 
m, 2014.
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Figure 3. Haytor, Dartmoor, United Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Haytor, Dartmoor, United Kingdom.
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Figure 4. View of the Jura from the artist's workshop window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4. View of the Jura from the artist's workshop window.
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Figure 5. The Vogelherd Lion (left panel) and the replica sitting on the artist's windowsill 
(right panel).  
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Figure 6. Extended Phenotype (extant) stoneware, 3.5 x 1.0 x 1.0m, 2013 (left panel); view of 
the inside of a section of Extended Phenotype 4 (right panel). 
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Figure 7. Model of Claustra.0.22 x 0.15 x 0.08m, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7. Maquette of Claustra 
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Figure 8. Two test sections for Claustra.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 8. Two test sections for Claustra. 
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Figure 9. Example of Mashrabiya from the Alijaferia Palace, Zaragotha, Spain (left panel); 
view of the lattice work of Claustra (right panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Example of Mashrabiya from the Alijaferia Palace, Zaragotha, Spain (left panel); view of the lattice work 
